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There is a widely felt temptation in interpreting Foucault’s writings on power to try to sever his 
theorization of power from his contemporary practice as a political activist and an organiser. Ac-
cordingly, what he says of power and the ways in which he seeks to exercise and practice it are 
two separate and eminently severable domains. For many, this interpretive temptation becomes 
nigh on impossible to resist in certain (in)famous cases where the particular position Foucault 
adopts at the time is seen to be a troubling or an unpopular one. “We suggest that there is no em-
barrassment in holding that some of Foucault's own political stances, such as his naïve ’abolition-
ist’ views about criminal justice or his ill-advised enthusiasm for the regime of the mullahs in 
Iran,” opine socio-legal scholars Alan Hunt and Gary Wickham, for example, “are frankly silly 
and barely worth debating [...] [A]ny serious assessment of Foucault depends not on the causes he 
espouses but on what those who read him can do with his enormously fertile leads and sugges-
tions.”1 This tendency is puzzling. It is hardly the case that Foucault’s political activities are un-
known or unremarked by scholars–indeed, detailed discussions of them occupy many of the pag-
es of Foucault’s biographies. But then again, as Marcelo Hoffman observes in his recent and excel-
lent book, Foucault and Power, the man himself arguably contributed to the separation between the 
theory and practice of power in “keep[ing] something of a distance between his discussions of 
these [his own, political] struggles and his theoretical presentations, as if they belonged to two 
markedly distinct, if not separate, registers” (6). Possibly this separation of the theoretical and the 
practical was abetted also by Foucault’s own rather too-cute insistence, taken to untenable ex-
tremes by many of his subsequent readers, that his theoretical interventions merely constituted a 
set of disparate “tools” and thus fell short of establishing an integrated approach to whatever its 
                                                 
1 A. Hunt and G. Wickham, Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of Law as Governance (London: Pluto, 1994), 36.  
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object was, especially an object (in Foucault’s hands, at any rate) as fissiparous as modern tech-
nologies of power.  
It is one of the great achievements of Hoffman’s Foucault and Power that in returning anew 
to the well-trod territory of “Foucault and power” it not only resists the temptation to separate 
the theoretical and the practical but in fact explicitly attempts to reunite them in something ap-
proaching a Foucaultian praxis whereby “Foucault’s thinking about power was dialectically related 
to his political practices” (8, his emphasis). Hofmann’s argument is that we cannot hope fully to 
understand either Foucault’s practice as a political militant (another distinguishing feature: Hof-
mann insists, correctly in my view, on reading Foucault as a militant political actor right up until 
the end of his life) or his diverse theorisations of power in isolation from each other. Instead, he 
contends that reading the practical and the theoretical dimensions of Foucault’s work in relation 
to each other reveals a rich set of insights about each and that insights derived from his practice 
as a political militant fed into his theoretical work, and vice versa. (This is essentially what Hof-
mann means by describing, as he does on page 8 and repeatedly thereafter, a “loosely dialectical 
interplay” between the theoretical and the practical. In his conclusion he is at pains to stress that 
Foucault would doubtless, and doubtless he is right, have refused an explicit self-understanding 
of his own work as “dialectical” in the classic Marxist sense. Thus far did he journey with Mao-
ists, but no further.)  
Hofmann sustains what is an original, powerful, and insightful argument over the course 
of four substantive chapters, a brief introduction where he lays out the argument of the book as a 
whole and a brief conclusion where he takes gentle issue with Julian Reid’s critical treatment of 
Foucault in his The Biopolitics of the War on Terror.2 In addition, Hoffman has included a lengthy 
appendix which is his translation of the first pamphlet report of the Groupe d’information sur les 
prisons (the “GIP”) entitled Investigation in 20 Prisons. It is impossible to do justice to the close and 
careful readings that Hofmann provides in each of the substantive chapters, but I shall first at-
tempt briefly to survey them and then to suggest what I think some of the interpretive and politi-
cal stakes of Hofmann’s reading of Foucault are, and consequently what some of its achievements 
are.  
Foucault and Power tracks three important moments in Foucault’s career as a militant politi-
cal activist and seeks to show how each related to his theorisation, and re-theorisation, of power 
relations. Doubtless there are other moments but I think, in selecting Foucault’s engagement with 
the GIP in Chapter Two, Foucault’s oft-misinterpreted and frequently condemned work on the 
Iranian Revolution in Chapter Four, and his late work in support of the Solidarity movement in 
Poland in Chapter Five, Hofmann has chosen some very important and revealing case studies. 
(Chapter Three, entitled “Beyond the Bellicose Model of Power?” is actually the longest of the 
substantive chapters and it sees Hoffman entering the debates over whether Foucault, in the years 
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after his Collège lecture course of 1976, “Society Must be Defended,” jettisoned the “war model” in 
favour of governmentality or “power as conduct” as a way to understand relations of power).  
In each of the three case study chapters, Hoffman deftly shows how Foucault’s thinking of 
power was affected by insights gained through political struggle and how, in turn, these practical 
political engagements were underpinned (and sometimes problematised by) theoretical insights 
about power made in the written work. In Chapter Two, “Foucault, the Prisoner Support Move-
ment, and Disciplinary Power,” for example, Hoffman argues that Foucault’s work with the GIP 
prepared the way for his theorisation of disciplinary power in Discipline and Punish and that the 
latter text has to be understood in the context of his collective struggles, through the GIP, over the 
intolerable conditions in French prisons. Hoffman contends that many of the central themes of 
Foucault’s later analysis of disciplinary power (such as, for example, the spatial partitioning of 
prisoners’ bodies and the temporal control of their movements and location) are prefigured in the 
information produced through the GIP, especially in the Investigation in 20 Prisons pamphlet re-
produced in the book as an appendix. Hoffman then goes on to suggest that Foucault, in the years 
after his withdrawal from it, generated a “critical dialogue with the prisoner support movement” 
(39) on the basis of theoretical insights developed in Discipline and Punish; (over, for example, the 
necessity to conduct broader struggles against forms of disciplinary power beyond the prison, 
and the challenges of constituting a resistant collectivity in the context of a form of power dedi-
cated to “the decomposition of collective activities” (38)). In Chapter Four, “People versus Popu-
lation: Foucault on the Iranian Revolution,” Hoffman advances the argument that Foucault makes 
a radical shift in his thinking on biopolitics in the late 1970s, ultimately jettisoning it in favour of 
the notion of governmentality. According to Hoffman, biopolitics, in focusing on population as an 
object of regulation, failed to capture the subjective dimension of the population (i.e. its being not 
only acted upon and objectified, but also acting–that is, its status as a “subject-object correlative to 
security techniques” (10)). Hoffman then poses a second distinction between the notion of the 
people and that of the population as constituted by liberal security apparatuses in order to help ex-
plain Foucault’s fascination with the Iranian revolution. On Hoffman’s account, Foucault’s inter-
est in Iran (pace Afary and Anderson, et. al.)3 was not motivated by a fanatical adherence to tradi-
tion over modernity but rather in the prospects that the Revolution fleetingly disclosed, in the 
figure of “the people,” a collective political opposition beyond liberal figures of population. Final-
ly, in Chapter Five, “Foucault, Poland, and Parrhesia,” Hoffman neatly traces the connections be-
tween the philosopher’s late reflections on the Stoic practice of parrhesia, or frankness in truth-
telling, in his Collège lecture courses, The Government of Self and Others and The Courage of Truth, 
and his engagement with the French government over its handling of the 1981 coup and the re-
pression of the Solidarity trade union movement.  
                                                 
3 J. Afary and K. B. Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
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This is an excellent and a thought-provoking book from which I have learnt a great deal. 
As with all thought-provoking books there are elements with which Foucault scholars will no 
doubt (productively) disagree (as some will, I expect, with Hoffman’s arguments about the con-
tinuing relevance of the “war model” of power in Foucault’s later work, as pursued in Chapter 
Two, or with the contention that Foucault summarily rejects biopolitics in favour of governmen-
tality, as argued in Chapter Four). But there is very little, almost nothing, to find fault with in the 
quality of Hoffman’s scholarship, his astute yet creative readings of the different moments in 
Foucault’s work, and his powerful interpretive premise that in order to understand Foucault the 
theorist of power we need first, or simultaneously, to come to grips with Foucault the militant po-
litical actor. And, that Hoffman’s Foucault is primarily a militant sets him apart from many of the 
more anodyne Foucaults doing service in the Academy today. Foucault and Power is a patient and 
well-argued interpretation of Foucault the thinker, but its political stakes are clear. In contending 
that Foucault continues to think about power in bellicose and strategic terms well into his late 
work, and in his insistence that the philosopher remains politically engaged to the end (that is, 
against the readings of Eric Paras and others that contend that Foucault morphs into a liberal eth-
icist in late life),4 Hoffman manages to achieve that rarest of feats: a return to Foucault’s texts that 
puts us back in touch with some of the pressing political motivations behind the theorisations 
many of us know so well (and that in other hands have become somewhat tired, mantric, platitu-
dinous). In his concluding chapter Hoffman takes issue with a criticism that Julian Reid makes of 
the philosopher in his book The Biopolitics of the War on Terror; namely that, in Hoffman’s words, 
whilst Foucault “offers an acute analysis of the disciplinary subjugation of bodies and the biopo-
litical subjugation of populations in liberal societies” (151) he does not provide a way to think be-
yond or to conceptualize life beyond these subjugations. Reid here rehearses a familiar critique of 
Foucault made by a range of different thinkers in a range of different (epistemological, normative, 
practical) registers. And such a critique (as many readers leaping to Foucault’s defence have 
done) can be answered in a range of ways. Hoffman’s approach (contra Reid, who turns to a series 
of other thinkers to remedy Foucault’s supposed defect) is to return to Foucault to insist that “an 
answer to the question of what life may become beyond its disciplinary and biopolitical subjectifi-
cation” (153) is already there in the dialectic of theoretical word and political deed, in Foucault’s 
exemplifying a critical philosopher engaged with, consumed by, and responsive to his present in 
critical philosophy as praxis and as a way of life. What, in the end, could be more Foucaultian 
than that?  
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